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The promise of wildland fire use (WFU) is that, over time, 
the fires will play a more natural role, creating a jigsaw-puzzle pattern 
of burned and regrowing patches over a landscape and gradually moving it 
closer to the stand structure and species composition that prevailed 
before fire exclusion became the policy.
The Hoover Fire—A WFU fire in Yosemite National Park, 2001.
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A hard-earned lesson
On a damp June day in 1994, lightning ignited 
a small forest fire in Glacier National Park. The fire, 
dubbed the Howling Fire after the resident wolves, 
stayed within about an acre for 6 weeks. Then in late 
July it roared to life, spreading to more than 2,000 
acres. Some people, including the editors of several 
area newspapers, thought it should be immediately 
suppressed. But the superintendent, with the help of 
fire behavior experts, decided the fire was probably not 
a threat to human life or property. With his blessing, 
it was allowed to burn, carefully monitored, until the 
rains came 4 months later. 
The Howling Fire represented a successful test 
of what was then called “prescribed natural fire”—
proving that managing a fire for ecosystem benefits 
could work even in forest types characterized by large, 
stand-replacing fire. “It showed scientists and Park 
Service managers that the policy was valid,” says 
Jan van Wagtendonk, a fire ecologist with the U.S. 
Geological Survey at Yosemite National Park.
The recent, intense wildfire seasons of the past 
few years seem to repeat a hard-earned lesson: trying 
to keep fire out of landscapes that thrive on fire is 
expensive, sometimes tragic, and ultimately futile. 
“It’s like the old saying, ‘You can pay me now, or 
you can pay me later,’” says Tom Nichols, chief of 
the National Park Service’s fire and aviation division. 
“When California burst into flames [in the summer of 
2008], I told folks, ‘Well, this is the pay-me-later part.’ 
You get blasted with thousands of [lightning] strikes, 
in fuels that have been untreated for years and years, 
and now everything is on fire.” 
For nearly a century, suppression has been the 
main strategy for dealing with wildfire on the Nation’s 
public lands. The resulting accumulation of flammable 
biomass now hangs over managers’ heads like an 
unpaid bill. The Howling Fire was a showcase for 
a different way of handling fire, one that has been 
tested and refined on national parks and wilderness 
areas for nearly 40 years now. First 
termed “prescribed natural fire,” the 
strategy now is called “wildland fire 
use for resource benefits,” commonly 
abbreviated to WFU. 
In its simplest essence, WFU 
means managing lightning-caused 
fires as they burn naturally instead of 
putting them out. Managers shape, 
nudge, and corral the fire to accomplish 
the ecological and fuel-reduction 
objectives that have been identified for it, and at the 
same time protect people, property, and key resources. 
WFU is not the same as prescribed fire (defined as 
manager-ignited fire), although its effects may be 
similar. The term “wildland fire use” refers only to 
fires ignited by lightning, managed so that they burn in 
predesignated areas under a strict set of prescriptions.
“We like to emphasize that we are not just ‘letting 
fires burn,’” says Tim Sexton, a Forest Service fire 
ecologist who’s in charge of both WFU and prescribed 
fire across the Nation’s 200 million acres (about 80.9 
million hectares) of Forest Service lands. “Rather, 
we are actively managing fires—protecting values at 
risk while achieving resource benefits in those places 
where fire has a positive effect.”
The promise of WFU is that, over time, the fires 
will play a more natural role, creating a jigsaw-puzzle 
pattern of burned and regrowing patches over a 
landscape and gradually moving it closer to the stand 
structure and species composition that prevailed before 
fire exclusion became the policy. In the process, the 
fires consume built-up fuels, making the landscape less 
susceptible to a more-severe fire later.
“What’s happening is that these past fires are 
regulating the growth of future fires, so that fire 
behavior becomes much more benign,” says Bob 
Mutch, a fire researcher who helped develop the 
Forest Service’s first WFU program. 
“When a new fire starts, it burns into 
old fires and becomes self-regulating.” 
The landscape, he says, becomes 
what fire ecologist Penny Morgan 
has called “fire-smart.” Says Mutch: 
“I think that’s a most appropriate 
description. The landscape adapts [to 
repeated WFU fires] in such a way that 
smart things happen—smart for the 
ecosystem and smart for society.” 
The Bad Luck WFU fire, Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, 1972.
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WFU is increasingly being applied to lands with 
other, non-wilderness objectives, including wildlife, 
timber, watershed, and recreation. There is much 
uncertainty surrounding its use, especially in these 
more-developed landscapes. Nearly a decade of JFSP-
supported science is helping to reduce some of that 
uncertainty.
WFU is playing an increasingly important role in 
restoring natural fire to fire-prone ecosystems, says 
van Wagtendonk. “As a fire ecologist, I’m interested in 
seeing fire play its ecological role wherever possible.” 
In particular, wildernesses and parks, where the goal 
is to restore and maintain natural ecological processes, 
are areas where fire can be allowed, he says, “and it 
should be.” Trying to exclude fire from these forests, 
he adds, is “sort of like trying to remove rain.”
Bob Mutch: 
A WFU Veteran Recalls the Early Days
Bob Mutch helped pioneer the Forest Service’s 
first WFU program in Montana’s Selway-Bitterroot 
Wilderness. The Wilderness Act of 1964, called for 
managing wilderness areas for their natural qualities, 
says Mutch, “but one of the most unnatural acts 
we’d been committing in the wild all these years was 
suppression of fire.” 
In the late 1960s, the National Park Service was 
experimenting with letting fire play its natural role. But 
no one in the Forest Service had tried it. Bud Moore, 
then director of fire for the Forest Service’s Northern 
Region, and Bill Worf, regional director of wilderness 
and recreation, got funding from the national Forest 
Service office for a pilot project. Moore and Worf 
approached Orville Daniels, forest supervisor on the 
Bitterroot, and enlisted his enthusiastic support. 
The men chose 100 square miles of the Whitecap Creek 
drainage for their study area. Whitecap Creek was both 
remote and diverse, representing a good cross section 
of topography and forest types. Dave Aldrich, a forester 
from Idaho, was chosen to lead the project. Mutch, a fire 
scientist from the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, 
would be the team’s co-leader and researcher. 
In August of 1970, Aldrich and Mutch visited Sequoia-
Kings Canyon National Park, where managers had 
started letting fires burn in higher elevations. “We got to 
fly the area, see a new fire they’d just detected,” says 
Mutch. “The matter-of-fact way that the new fire was 
allowed to burn rather than being suppressed was a 
revealing opportunity for us.”
The following summer, the five men hiked the 9 miles 
from Paradise Guard Station to Cooper’s Flat and 
pitched their tents. They built a campfire and talked late 
into the night about how to carry off “this radical idea of 
letting nature do its thing,” says Mutch. 
The team spent the next year thoroughly analyzing the 
study area—sampling vegetation, collecting evidence of 
fire history, studying records of past fires, and charting 
the effects of fire exclusion. By the summer of 1972, 
their plan was complete. Daniels and Mutch traveled 
to Washington, DC, and presented it to Forest Service 
Chief John McGuire, who approved it on the spot.
“Three weeks later I was back in the White Cap,” says 
Mutch, “and an aerial patrol detected a brand-new fire 
in Bad Luck Creek. I did the initial assessment, and the 
decision was made to allow it to burn.” The Bad Luck 
fire lasted 4 days and burned less than one-fourth of 
an acre, but in the following year there was a more 
significant incident. A prescribed natural fire in the Fitz 
Creek drainage burned about 1,600 acres—more than 
had been burned by all the previous fires of record in the 
Whitecap drainage. 
The Fitz Creek fire lasted 43 days and attracted national 
media attention. It also escaped the bounds of the 
management area, “which caused some consternation,” 
Mutch recalls. The escaped portion of the fire was 
suppressed after burning an additional 1,600 acres 
without causing undue damage. The Forest Service’s 
new prescribed natural fire policy had passed its first 
test. 
In the summer of 2001, Mutch met Moore, Worf, 
Daniels, and Aldrich for a 30-year reunion hike to 
Cooper’s Flat. Back at Paradise, they held a public 
anniversary celebration for an experiment that is proving 
to have far-reaching consequences for America’s public 
forests.
Bob Mutch and Dave Aldrich hiking the Whitecap Creek 
drainage in 1970.
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rethinking suppression
The Federal Wildland Management Policy now 
directs managers to “allow lightning-caused fires to 
play, as nearly as possible, their natural ecological 
role in wilderness.” Accordingly, WFU programs have 
been developed and expanded in many national parks 
and Forest Service wilderness areas. 
Most of the natural ignitions on national forest 
wilderness lands are still suppressed, for a complex 
of operational and cultural reasons. Nevertheless, 
national forest managers of both wilderness and non-
wilderness lands are working to increase WFU’s use. 
“For example, the Krassell Ranger District, on the 
Payette National Forest, manages more than half of 
the lightning ignitions as WFU fires,” says Sexton. 
“Similarly, the West Fork District of the Bitterroot 
National Forest also dominantly manages lightning 
ignitions as WFU.” 
National forests and national parks that have 
developed successful WFU programs include Sequoia 
and Kings Canyon, Bandelier, Yosemite, Saguaro, and 
Grand Teton National Parks and the Selway-Bitterroot, 
Bob Marshall, Frank Church-River of No Return, 
Bridger-Teton, and Gila-Aldo Leopold wildernesses. 
Some national forests also have extended their WFU 
programs to lands outside wilderness areas; these 
include the Bitterroot, Boise, Gallatin, Gila, and 
Payette National Forests. Most Montana national 
forests and all those in Utah allow WFU across their 
whole acreage with minor exceptions, Sexton says.
In the eastern United States, the Great Smoky 
Mountains and Everglades National Parks have 
active WFU programs, as do the Ouachita and 
George Washington National Forests. More than half 
the national forest acreage in the Forest Service’s 
Southern Region is available for WFU, according to 
Sexton. Other Federal agencies that practice WFU 
are the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
Early Alternatives to Suppression 
A suppress-all-fires policy was adopted by the fledgling 
Forest Service in 1910 after an unusually severe 
fire season, and it was subsequently adopted by 
the National Park Service. Other approaches were 
proposed as early as 1916, when Roy Headley, a Forest 
Service district forester in California, began letting low-
intensity fires burn in remote areas of national forest 
lands as long as they didn’t threaten valuable timber. In 
1934, Headley, then chief of Forest Service fire control, 
proposed withholding some suppression resources from 
back-country fires. Wilderness advocates Bob Marshall 
and Aldo Leopold supported the proposal, but it was 
turned down. 
Later, in 1950, the Park Service approved a research 
area in a remote, high-elevation area of Sequoia 
National Park that would be allowed to burn if it caught 
fire. The approval was for the one case only and was 
explicitly not to be taken as a policy change. At 
Yosemite National Park, assistant chief ranger 
George Briggs recommended allowing fires 
to burn in high-elevation areas once it was 
determined that sparse fuel and natural fire 
breaks would probably stop them before 
they did any damage. All these proposals 
rested on economic arguments, but Briggs’s 
proposal also made an ecological case for letting 
wildfires burn. 
The early 1960s produced the first glimmerings of 
an ecosystem-management philosophy for parks 
and wilderness areas. The Park Service was having 
difficulties with wildlife management, and the Secretary 
of the Interior convened a committee to look into the 
problem. The committee’s chairman was Starker 
Leopold, son of Aldo Leopold. The Leopold Report, 
released in 1963, went beyond the wildlife problems 
to recommend that national parks be managed as 
ecosystems. In 1968, the Park Service changed its fire 
policy accordingly: fires were to be allowed to burn as 
long as they were likely to achieve predefined objectives 
and could be contained if necessary.
Programs to manage natural fire sprang up almost 
immediately at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National 
Parks, Saguaro National Monument (today a national 
park), and Yosemite National Park. In the Forest 
Service, WFU programs began in the 
Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness on the 
Bitterroot National Forest and the 
Gila Wilderness in New Mexico. 
These programs, then known as 
“prescribed natural fire,” were 
very successful, and in 1978 
the Forest Service mitigated 
its full-suppression policy 
to accommodate a new one 
encouraging wildland fire use, 
carefully prescribed. 
Grasses recolonize a burned slope in the Bob Marshall Wilderness.
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chainsaw surgery
The notion of letting a fire burn itself out is simple 
in concept but complicated in execution. Wildfire is, 
by definition, wild—barely subject to human control. 
Even with the best reconnaissance and the latest 
planning tools, a manager can never know for sure that 
a WFU fire will burn as expected. 
“It’s chainsaw surgery,” says Guy Pence, fire staff 
officer on the Boise National Forest. “I can’t draw a 
line and promise the fire will stay on this side. I’m 
dependent on weather: wind, temperature, humidity.” 
He can do a pretty good job of forecasting and 
predicting, he says. “But it’s not scalpel surgery.” 
WFU requires extensive advance planning. First, 
the management plan for a park or forest—the publicly 
reviewed, NEPA-compliant document that governs 
all management activities for a span of years—has to 
permit WFU. Then the fire management plan—the 
execution document—has to spell out a detailed 
process for managing a WFU fire. Managers face a 
long checklist of considerations: Is it the right season 
of the year? Is the ignition in the right place on the 
forest? Are the winds likely to remain favorable? Are 
there natural barriers like talus slopes that will check 
the fire? Is the fire likely to burn into territory where it 
must be suppressed, or to escape the area altogether? 
Will it send large quantities of smoke into neighboring 
communities? If it gets out of hand, are there enough 
firefighters to fight it safely? Can people live with the 
blaze, the smoke, and the uncertainty for weeks or 
months, until the fall rains come?
Nerves of steel may not be strictly required, 
but they help. Many forest supervisors and park 
superintendents are understandably uncomfortable 
with making a “go” decision on a WFU fire. The 
ecological and fuel-reduction benefits won’t accrue 
until later, but the risks are immediate—risk of the 
fire’s escape, risk of heavy smoke, of accusations of 
mismanagement, of official disapproval and public 
wrath. “Nobody wants to be the supervisor on the 
next Yellowstone,” says Pence—referring to the 1988 
wildfire blowup that thrust WFU policy (then known 
as “prescribed natural fire”) into national headlines. 
“It’s tricky business,” he says. “You get a hollow 
feeling in the pit of your stomach.”
Pence, who started his career as a firefighter, is one 
of a growing number of advocates of implementing 
WFU across the entire Federal forest system. In his 
younger days, he says, “I suppressed many fires that 
probably didn’t need to be suppressed.” He has been 
managing fires for 40 years, long enough to see the 
benefits: a rejuvenated forest community, enhanced 
wildlife habitat, and reduced risk from a really big fire. 
“I hear people say after a fire, ‘we lost it all,’” Pence 
says. “But it’s not lost; it’s just changed.”
Yellowstone: Wildland Fire Reaffirmed
WFU has had setbacks, the most notorious being 
the Yellowstone fires of 1988. Based on a plan 
written in 1972, Yellowstone National Park allowed 
several lightning fires to burn in a remote corner 
of the park in late June. At the same time, Forest 
Service managers of the Absaroka-Beartooth 
Wilderness just north of Yellowstone were 
monitoring the Storm Creek Fire. 
By the end of July, unusually dry conditions coupled 
with high winds convinced managers of both 
agencies to suppress all fires that were currently 
burning as well as all new starts. Human-caused 
fires from outside of the park added to the problem. 
In fact, the North Fork fire, which threatened Old 
Faithful Village, was started by a woodcutter’s 
chainsaw on the adjacent Targhee National Forest. 
Of the nine major fires that burned almost 1.4 
million acres, six were ignited outside the park 
and four were human-caused. Accusations of 
irresponsible management were common, and the 
National Park Service was left with a serious public 
relations problem.
Nevertheless, the team that reviewed the 
Yellowstone incident reaffirmed the ecological 
value of allowing fire and recommended several 
measures to strengthen fire management. A few 
years after Yellowstone, it was plain even to the 
untrained eye that the park’s landscape had been 
invigorated and renewed. The ecological benefits 
of WFU in fire-adapted landscapes have been 
consistently confirmed. 
Lightning strike.
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catching up with the biomass
Between 1998 and 2006, more than 1.4 million 
acres (about 579,000 hectares) have burned in WFU 
fires on lands managed by all five of the Federal 
agencies with WFU programs. The Forest Service 
leads in both numbers of fires (1,854) and area burned 
(950,211 acres; 384,538 hectares) during that period. 
The tally for 2008 so far is 133 fires and about 172,000 
acres (69,606 hectares) burned, according to Sexton.
Some scientists and managers worry that WFU 
isn’t being applied as widely as it needs to be. Even 
the most successful WFU programs, they say, are not 
working fast enough to restore the fire patterns that 
prevailed before European-American settlement. For 
example, as of 2000, only one in five of the 400 Forest 
Service-managed wilderness areas in the lower 48 
states permitted WFU in its fire management plan. A 
more recent survey of wilderness managers revealed 
that only one-fourth of the lightning-caused fires on 
their lands between 2002 and 2004 occurred in areas 
that had been approved for WFU. Of those ignitions, 
only 40 percent were actually managed as WFU fires. 
In short, many acres that could benefit from WFU are 
not yet covered by a WFU program, and even within 
those areas, most fires are still suppressed. 
Sexton argues for a more positive outlook. “The 
number of fires is not so meaningful as area burned,” 
he says. “The total area of Forest Service lands where 
WFU is permitted has increased by more than 20 
million acres since 2000. Yes, there’s still room for 
improvement—but we are making progress.” 
Barriers and facilitators
Some of the reasons managers might hesitate to 
make a “go” decision were revealed in a recent survey 
of National Forest wilderness fire managers. The 
study was led by then-graduate student Dustin Doane, 
a Forest Service smokejumper, with the help of Jay 
O’Laughlin, Penny Morgan, and Carol Miller. 
Building on earlier, JFSP-supported work by 
Carol Miller and Peter Landres, Doane and his 
colleagues identified a host of factors that influence 
a “go/no go” decision. These include constraints 
within the organizational culture (for example, a 
strong bias toward suppression), political boundaries 
(for example, concern that the fire would burn too 
close to neighboring lands), organizational capacity 
(lack of time and resources to plan for WFU), policy 
directives (for example, a blanket suppression order at 
the regional level), and public perceptions (potential 
negative reactions to smoke or the risk of damage to 
private property). 
The managers also suggested ways the Forest 
Service could achieve more “go” decisions: supporting 
WFU at all levels of the organization, giving managers 
greater flexibility for managing WFU in wilderness, 
increasing awareness of the national directive to 
manage ignitions as WFU, increasing land areas 
available to WFU, and increasing the organization’s 
knowledge about WFU.
Scientists are working hard to add to that body 
of knowledge. Thanks to many studies funded and 
disseminated by the JFSP, managers now have a 
better understanding of what a wildfire can do, what 
it is likely to do, and what the odds are that it will 
do something unmanageable. “Those managers 
whom we might characterize as ‘risk-averse,’” says 
Sexton, “might not be risk-averse if they have a better 
understanding of what the real versus perceived 
risks are. JFSP research is providing better ways of 
assessing those risks. That’s the real payoff of JFSP 
work.” 
WFu works
First of all, much observation and study over the 
35-year history of WFU have confirmed its ecological 
benefits. WFU is clearly doing what it is supposed to 
do: restoring fire as a natural process and mitigating 
hazardous fire conditions resulting from past fire 
exclusion.
For example, a case study conducted by Matt 
Rollins of the Forest Service and Penelope Morgan 
and graduate student Zack Holden of the University 
of Idaho as part of a comprehensive JFSP research 
The Papoose WFU fire on the Payette National Forest in 
Idaho, 2007.
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project (JFSP 01-1-1-06) assessed the 
effects of 30 years of wildland fire use 
programs on the 230,800 acres (about 
93,401 hectares) Gila Wilderness in 
New Mexico and the 29,500 acres 
(about 11,938 hectares) Saguaro 
Wilderness in Arizona. The timing and extent of fires 
in the ponderosa pinedominated forests of these two 
wilderness areas have been richly documented since 
early in the 20th century. Rollins, Morgan, and Holden 
sampled in areas burned 0, 1, 2, or 3 or more times in 
25 years, collecting data on age, size, and height of 
trees and structure and composition of forest stands.
They found that, in general, repeated WFU fires 
since 1972 have reduced the density of small-diameter 
trees without significantly affecting the density of 
larger trees. In other words, the WFU fires have tended 
to push the forest toward a condition closer to that of 
the ponderosa pine forests of pre-fire exclusion days, 
with forests of many large trees and snags and some 
small trees and logs. 
Along with the structural changes has come an 
increase in the resilience of these forests to severe 
fire. “Ponderosa pine forests in the Gila Wilderness 
and Saguaro Wilderness are structurally diverse 
and resistant to fires burning during the natural fire 
season,” say the authors in a 2007 article in the journal 
Fire Ecology, “suggesting that repeated WFU fires 
have restored forest resilience to fire.” Says coauthor 
Penny Morgan: “Not just big trees survived, but there 
were lots of logs, small trees, and spatial variability. It 
looked beautiful, and I assume such a diverse structure 
would be useful to wildlife, although our study didn’t 
look at that aspect.”
JFSP-supported research such as this offers 
valuable guidance to fire managers in making a WFU 
decision, says Dave Bartlett, fire management officer 
on the Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks. 
“Research is the basis of our decision process,” says 
Bartlett. “We use what we know about the fire return 
interval along with local inputs like slope, aspect, 
terrain, and so on, to analyze our landscape and 
determine why we should burn and what the priority 
for treating a given area is.” Like all agencies with 
WFU programs, Sequoia and Kings Canyon parks 
have a research officer, fire ecologist Tony Caprio, 
who sees to it that management decisions are informed 
by the latest research. “He’s our conduit for the 
science,” says Bartlett. 
Recently published results from a JFSP study 
(JFSP 01-1-1-06) illustrate the long-term benefits of 
WFU.  In this study, the authors examined the effects 
Another WFU fire in the Sequoia National Forest, 
the Broder-Beck fire.
of successive naturally occurring 
fires in the Illilouette Creek Basin in 
Yosemite National Park.  They found 
that fire “can exhibit self-limiting 
characteristics,” meaning that as 
fire consumes fuel over time, fire-
induced effects of subsequent fires are lessened.  This 
information helps fire managers better anticipate the 
effects of allowing fires to burn and improves their 
ability to manage WFU programs.
Morgan, Holden, and the others did look at  
the implications of severe fires for fish in another 
JFSP-funded study on the Gila Wilderness  
(JFSP 05-2-1-101), which examined the effects of 
WFU fires on imperiled Gila chub and trout species 
in the Gila River and its tributaries. Fish biologists 
were concerned that the fires were causing landscape 
changes that might threaten the fish. They needed a 
map of areas where fires, if they occurred, were likely 
to burn the most severely. 
Morgan and her colleagues used pre- and post-
fire satellite images and field data to map fire severity, 
and then developed statistical models of where fires 
had burned severely over the last 20 years. They then 
worked with Forest Service researchers to modify a 
decision support tool developed earlier for the Boise 
River drainage (with JFSP support) by Forest Service 
researchers. “We adapted it to the Gila Wilderness to 
help managers identify areas where the likelihood of 
severe fires overlapped areas where the vulnerable fish 
populations were,” says Morgan. Also included was 
a component to help identify where landslides were 
most likely to occur and where channel morphology 
made fish populations particularly vulnerable. The 
researchers delivered the tool to Gila managers in the 
fall of 2008. 
Repeated WFU fires 
have restored
forest resilience.
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Defining the target
If the goal is to restore natural fire patterns, 
managers need to know what those patterns looked 
like. Studies of fire scars on trees are widely used to 
reconstruct the occurrence and extent of historical fire 
regimes; these reconstructions suggest the forest’s 
structural, species-composition, and successional 
patterns through time. However, because wildfire is 
so variable in its effects, fire-scar sampling yields an 
incomplete record, and so it’s uncertain how much can 
be inferred from a given set of samples. 
In another study within the comprehensive project 
mentioned previously (JFSP 01-1-1-06), graduate 
student Brandon Collins and and Scott Stephens of the 
University of California at Berkeley sampled fire scars 
in two California national parks where WFU has been 
practiced since 1973. They looked at Illilouette Creek 
basin in Yosemite National Park and Sugarloaf Creek 
basin in Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Park. 
They calculated the fire rotation and extent suggested 
by the fire scars and compared them to known data 
from the WFU fires, derived from fire atlases and 
satellite images of burn severity. 
In most cases, they found, the fire-scar based 
estimates greatly underestimated the actual extent of 
the fire. In other words, the actual fire was larger than 
the fire-scar sample said it was, often much larger. 
On the other hand, some fires didn’t show up in the 
fire-scar record at all. What this means for managers 
is that tree-ring studies tell only a partial story about 
fire extent or size, and the story may be less reliable 
in forest types characterized by short burn intervals. 
Because the data are still inconsistent, it’s not time 
to propose a correction factor, say the researchers. 
“Rather, we intend for this study to serve as an 
initial step in attempting to meaningfully understand 
uncertainty in fire-scar based reconstructions.” 
Assessing progress
Managers also need to know whether their  
burning program is actually moving 
the forest closer to the desired 
condition. In another JFSP-funded 
study (JFSP 03-1-1-07), Carol Miller, 
a fire ecologist at the Aldo Leopold 
Wilderness Research Institute in 
Missoula, computer-simulated five 
fire regimes on the Boise National 
Forest. “My goal was to evaluate 
the consequences of increasing 
burning with WFU in terms of the land management 
objectives,” she says, “and to determine if there’s a 
threshold where there’s too much fire.”
Miller chose a modeling tool called TELSA (Tool 
for Exploratory Landscape Scenario Analysis), which 
is a “state-and-transition” type of fire succession 
model—that is, it illustrates how patches of vegetation 
on the landscape move from one successional state 
to the next across space and time. She modeled the 
effects of five different fire regimes on forest structure 
and composition. The first fire regime was based on 
the actual fire record for the landscape from 1908 to 
2003. The next four represented successive increases 
in the frequency of fires and the frequency of large-
fire years. Effects of the simulated fires were folded 
into subsequent simulation runs, so that the modeling 
simulated the cumulative effects of fires across the 
landscape over 1,000 years. 
Miller found that the scenarios with more fires 
resulted in a younger forest characterized by earlier 
successional stages. She also found that these younger 
forests were much more variable in structure and 
composition than management plans called for. The 
middle fire-regime, scenario 3, turned out to produce 
the landscape conditions that were closest to those 
desired (even though these too showed a lot of 
variation from desired conditions from time to time). 
On the other hand, scenario 5, with an average  
33-year fire rotation, ended up moving the landscape 
away from desired future conditions, 
probably because it provided too much 
fire. 
All models necessarily simplify 
real-life processes. Even so, the 
TELSA simulation offers a way for 
managers to refine their assessment 
of how much fire is enough to meet 
their goals. “In wilderness areas and 
parks,” Miller writes, “there has been 
The August 2006 Tamarack WFU fire in the Sequoia National Forest.
The TELSA simulation 
offers a way for 
managers to refine 
their assessment of 
how much
fire is enough
to meet their goals.
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effects of fire. These effects are 
determined from the expected severity 
of the fire and the desired future 
condition for the landscape in question. 
The second tool, a GIS-based 
model called BurnPro, enables 
managers to estimate the annual 
probability of burning in a given 
landscape. Fire risks and benefits can 
be calculated by overlaying BurnPro output with fire-
effects maps created by FEPF. The enhanced maps 
help managers identify those areas that most need 
fuel-reduction treatments. They also help them weigh 
the risks and benefits of various treatment options over 
both the short and the long term. 
In the course of developing these tools, Black 
and her collaborators embarked on an intensive 
technology-transfer program. “We recognized that 
success goes beyond achieving recognition and 
adoption by a few research-minded managers,” she 
writes. “Success required institutionalization of the 
knowledge and models.” The team’s outreach program 
included determining managers’ needs early in the 
development process, enlisting managers as partners in 
developing the planning tools, and providing ongoing 
support for users. In a subsequent JFSP-funded project 
(JFSP 05-4-1-20), Black and her colleagues developed 
more and better ways to disseminate and teach these 
tools, including Internet outreach, workshops, and in-
person consultations. 
getting the public on your side
One of the biggest public concerns about WFU 
is smoke. When a fire is suppressed, the smoke dies 
with it, but when it lingers on as a WFU fire, people 
little discussion about how much fire 
is appropriate, probably because any 
and all lightning-ignited fire is viewed 
as being commensurate with land 
management goals.” Miller’s study 
promises to help managers take a more 
nuanced view.
In a subsequent study  
(JFSP 04-2-1-110), Miller and her 
colleagues are modeling the behavior of past WFU-
suitable fires that were suppressed, reconstructing them 
as if they had been allowed to burn. “It’s a Monday-
morning-quarterback way of assessing progress, or 
lack thereof,” she says. “We ask where specific WFU 
candidates would have spread if we hadn’t suppressed 
them.” Results from this study will supplement the 
fire-regime analysis that managers are already doing, 
enabling them to better quantify the costs and benefits 
of managing a fire for WFU.
Decision support tools
Managers also need to quantify the tradeoffs of 
wildland fire use at landscape scales, so they can 
make well-calculated decisions about when and where 
to apply it. There are several good planning and 
modeling tools available. Fire-behavior models such 
as BEHAVE and FARSITE (developed at the Missoula 
Fire Sciences Laboratory by Patricia Andrews and 
Mark Finney, respectively) can be combined with 
accurate fuel maps to help managers make reasonable 
predictions about the behavior of a WFU fire not only 
immediately after ignition, but throughout the weeks 
and months it will burn.
However, says Anne Black of the Aldo Leopold 
Wilderness Research Institute, some of the planning 
and decision-support tools available to managers tend 
to focus on fire as an immediate, short-term risk at 
the stand level, rather than an unfolding long-term 
ecological benefit at the landscape level. Thus,  
they don’t support WFU as well as they might.
In a JFSP-funded effort to fill that gap  
(JFSP 99-1-3-16), Black and her collaborators, 
including Carol Miller, developed two tools to help 
managers weigh the risks and benefits of various 
treatment options, including WFU, over both the short 
and long term. The first tool, Fire Effects Planning 
Framework (FEPF), is a “meta-model” that links 
publicly available analysis tools, data, and knowledge 
to generate information for planning at a variety of 
spatial and temporal scales. FEPF guides managers 
in systematically mapping and quantifying the likely 
A mixed hardwood forest burns in a WFU fire on Sulphur  
Mountain, Arkansas.
The enhanced maps 
help managers
identify those
areas that most 
need fuel-reduction 
treatments.
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have to live with the smoke until autumn rains put the 
fire out. The smoke can add to already-polluted skies, 
potentially pushing them over Federal thresholds for 
air quality. (Sometimes a good potential WFU ignition 
has to be suppressed, says van Wagtendonk, because 
air-quality authorities have determined that the smoke 
would raise air-pollution levels past legal limits.)
Several JFSP-funded studies have addressed 
different aspects of smoke management, including 
improving the reliability of models that forecast 
wind patterns, estimating how much smoke a fire 
will produce, tracking the spatial patterns of smoke 
dispersal, and improving estimates of the contribution 
of WFU fires to regional air pollution.
Studies now in progress include improvements 
to the BlueSky smoke model to provide real-time 
predictions of surface smoke from fires, both wild 
and manager-ignited. Narasimhan Larkin of the 
Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station 
is measuring smoke produced by WFU fires and 
comparing the measurements with predictions from 
BlueSky to improve the model’s predictive capability 
(JFSP 06-1-1-12). WFU fires are good for this kind 
of study, he notes, because they burn for a long time, 
producing a lot of smoke and a lot of data.
In another study (JFSP 08-1-6-09), Shawn 
Urbanski of the Forest Service Rocky Mountain 
Research Station is using both a ground-based LIDAR 
and airborne instruments to measure the composition 
and movement of smoke plumes from wildland fires 
over 3 years. Results will help improve 
the accuracy of smoke-plume models.
A broader range of 
landscapes
The ecological benefits of fire are 
well known, and the fuel-treatment 
benefits of WFU are documented by 
many examples. The Forest Service’s Tim Sexton is 
optimistic about recent progress in applying WFU to 
a broader range of landscapes. “We’ve made great 
strides in the past 5 years,” he says. “We were at 40 
million acres [about 16 million hectares available for 
WFU] in 2003, and we’re now at 60 million acres. And 
every year more acres become available through land 
management plan revisions.” 
He is constantly prodding managers in every 
Forest Service region to increase WFU acres 
burned. “My goal is not to have anywhere in the 200 
million acres of Forest Service lands where WFU 
is prohibited,” he says. “That doesn’t mean every 
fire will be managed as a WFU fire. But if WFU is 
allowed on every acre we manage, then there’ll be no 
restrictions on a local manager taking that strategy 
should the opportunity arise.”
Bob Mutch cautions that “One size does not fit 
all” when it comes to WFU. It’s most appropriate 
for large expanses of land that can accommodate 
a spreading fire without undesired side effects. In 
smaller landscapes, he says, the needed treatment is 
often better accomplished through prescribed burning 
rather than WFU.
In sum, through practice, research, and continuous 
learning, WFU is becoming a viable alternative 
to the blanket paradigm of wildfire suppression. 
Concurrently, as fuels build up, as firefighting becomes 
more expensive, and as firefighters continue to be sent 
into harm’s way, the reflex to suppress all wildfires is 
being increasingly challenged. “We can 
keep pouring money on large fires if 
we want,” says the Park Service’s Tom 
Nichols, “But we have to think in terms 
of the future. It may feel safer to put 
the fire out now. But that just means 
someone else will inherit the problem 
down the road.”
It may feel safer to 
put the fire out now. 
But that just means 
someone else will 
inherit the problem 
down the road.
The Warm Fire, Kaibab National Forest, Arizona, 2006.
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